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Abstract
This paper explores the empirical properties of alternative measures of the taxation of income
from capital, using UK data over the last thirty years. We analyse measures of effective
marginal and average tax rates, based on applying the legal parameters of the tax system to a
hypothetical investment; and also measures based on observed tax payments or liabilities,
scaled by various measures of income. There is a significant difference between these
measures, both in their level and in how they move over time. The implicit assumption in
some empirical work that these measures are broadly comparable to each other is not
justified. 
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1  Introduction
Devereux (2003) discusses a number of theoretical issues which arise in the measurement
of taxes on income from capital. This paper illustrates some of these issues in the context
of the development of taxes in the UK over the last three decades. In particular, we
provide estimates for the UK for many of the measures discussed in Devereux (2003). In
some cases, we also provide alternative estimates of the same measure, based on
differences in the underlying assumptions. For example, we provide estimates of
effective tax rates with and without personal taxes, for alternative sources of finance and
for investments in different assets. We also deconstruct measures of average tax rates
based on accounting data and tax revenue data, by investigating in more detail the factors
which determine their values.
Since this is, in effect, a companion paper to Devereux (2003), we do not repeat here the
analysis in that paper. The focus here is on quantitative differences between alternative
measures. The central question is simple to state, although less simple to answer: How
important in practice are differences between measures? That is, can empirical
researchers pick a measure which is relatively easy to construct, secure in the knowledge
that different measures typically generate similar values? Or, to put it another way, is the
discussion of alternative ways of measuring taxes on income from capital simply an
arcane debate, of little practical interest or use?
The evidence presented below indicates that different measures do indeed generate very
different values. We do not go as far as testing alternative measures in, say, an
econometric model of investment.
1 However, given the results presented below, it seems
highly unlikely that similar econometric results would be generated by using the different
measures; not only do the measures take different values, their movement over time is
also quite different.
It is of course not surprising that some of these measures differ – after all they do not all
attempt to measure the same thing. It is well known, for example, that a given tax regime
may have high average rates but low marginal rates. What may be more surprising is that
even measures which are designed to capture the same aspect of the tax system can also
vary widely. For example, average tax rates differ depending on whether they are
constructed using aggregate tax revenue data, accounting data or tax legislation. Such
differences reflect, for example, whether the measure is forward-looking, and whether
and how different investment projects or firms are aggregated. This suggests that
empirical work investigating the taxation of income from capital should take careful
account of how those taxes are measured. Measures should be chosen on the basis of how
well they conform to the underlying economic theory, and to taxation in practice. A
measure chosen on the basis of how easy it is to construct may give misleading results.
We proceed in Section 2 by presenting a summary of a number of different measures,
corresponding to the main measures discussed in Devereux (2003). After comparing
these broad measures, we then investigate some of them in more detail. In particular, in
Section 3, we examine the impact of alternative assumptions on measures of effective3
marginal and average tax rates, derived for a hypothetical investment project along the
lines of Devereux and Griffith (2003). In section 4, we turn to measures based on
accounting data, using data on UK listed companies from Thomson Financial
Datastream. In Section 5, we analyse measures based on aggregate data on tax revenues
and develop a measure based on income generated in the corporate sector of the economy
only. Section 6 briefly concludes.
2  A brief summary of measures
We begin with a brief summary of alternative approaches, based on the analysis and
classifications in Devereux (2003). Figure 1 presents a summary of five main approaches
and Table 3. 1 presents pairwise correlation coefficients for the measures. Detailed
descriptions of the derivation of each measure are provided in the Appendix.
Table  1: Co-efficients of correlation between tax measures from Figure 1





GKS 0.6530* 0.7210* 1
13 13 13
ATR -0.1858 -0.0787 -0.1870 1
31 31 13 32
ITR 0.4896* -0.2566 0.9334* -0.1894 1
27 27 10 27 27
ITR-COR 0.8129* 0.6374* 0.5073 0.3833 0.7011* 1
13 13 13 13 10 13
Notes: The number in italics indicates the number of observations the coefficient is based
on. Starred values are significant at the 5%-level. Only data from 1970 onwards used.
Tax measures as in Figure 1.4

















Notes: Sources and definitions of measures are provided in the Appendix. These notes are
only intended to provide a brief explanation and the main assumptions.
EATR: Effective average tax rate. (Economic profit rate 20%, assets: weighted average
of plant & machinery and land & buildings, source of finance: weighted average of
equity and debt, interest and inflation rates: actual values).
EMTR: Effective marginal tax rate. (Assets: weighted average of plant & machinery and
land & buildings, source of finance: weighted average of equity and debt, interest and
inflation rates: actual values).
GKS: Effective marginal tax rate based on macroeconomic data, calculated as suggested
in Gordon et al. (2003).
ATR: Average tax rate based on company accounts data.
ITR: Implicit tax rate for capital based on macroeconomic data as calculated by Mendoza
et al.
ITR-COR: Implicit tax rate based on macroeconomic data for corporate sector only.
This figure reveals enormous variation across alternative measures of the tax rate on
capital income. This is supported by the correlation coefficients, which are insignificantly
different from zero for most measures, and even negative for some.
2 Some variation is
due to fundamental differences in the approach taken, and some is due to differences in
data. Before further analysing these differences, we briefly explain assumptions used in
Figure 1.
•  Effective marginal tax rate (EMTR).
•  Effective average tax rate (EATR).
These two measures are shown for a general investment, using the approach set out in
Devereux and Griffith (2003). We show the effective tax rate for an investment which is
partly in plant and machinery and partly in buildings; it is financed partly by new equity
or retained earnings and partly by debt.
3 For the EATR we assume a rate of economic5
profit of 20%.
4 At this stage we exclude personal taxes; in effect this could be seen as an
overall effective tax rate for a non-tax-paying shareholder who did not receive any tax
credit associated with dividend payments by UK companies. To make the measures more
comparable to the others in Figure 1, we allow the economic parameters to vary over
time. That is, the values of the real interest rate and the inflation rate are based on actual
values observed in each year. In addition, the weights attributed to alternative assets and
sources of finance also vary over time.
5 However, we assume a constant economic
depreciation rate for each asset.
6
•  Average tax rate, based on company accounting records (ATR).
This measure is based on individual company accounting records taken from Datastream
– more details are provided in Section 4. Broadly, the measure shown here is based on the
UK corporation tax liability of the company, expressed as a proportion of the total pre-tax
profit (after interest payments and depreciation).
•  Overall average tax rate on capital income, based on aggregate tax revenue data
(ITR).
•  Average tax rate of the corporate sector (ITR-COR)
The fist of these is the measure proposed by Mendoza et al (1994). It is based on the ratio
of revenues from all taxes deemed to be on capital to a measure of the operating surplus
of the economy. The second is a related measure developed here. It uses a similar
methodology, but is restricted to the corporate sector of the economy, so that it is more
comparable to the other measures. It is defined as corporation tax revenues divided by
corporate income, including profits from financial property income.
•  Marginal tax rate of the corporate sector (GKS).
Finally, we also investigate the measure of the marginal tax rate proposed by Gordon et al
(2003). For comparison with the other measures we do not include taxes levied at the
personal level. This measure is based on the difference between actual tax revenue and
the tax revenue which would be generated by a R-based cash flow tax levied in the
corporate sector. To compute the latter, we make four adjustments to actual taxable
income: (1) add back net interest payments, (2) add back capital allowances, (3) deduct
new investment expenditure, and (4) deduct changes in inventories. The precise
definitions used are set out in the Data Appendix.
As might be expected, these measures give very different accounts of the development of
taxes on capital income in the UK corporate sector over the last three decades. At the
extreme, for example, in 1981, at the height of a recession, the EMTR was around 4%,
while the Mendoza et al (1994) approach - ITR - generated a rate of slightly under 75%.
Of course, these two approaches are not attempting to measure the same thing: the first
attempts to measure the impact of taxes on the cost of capital, while the second is based
on tax revenues. It has long been known that marginal and average tax rates can be very
different from each other. But these difference do imply that, for example, using the ITR
as a measure of the impact of tax on investment at the margin could be seriously
misleading.6
However, even measures which might be thought to be comparable are very different
from each other. Compare, for example, the ITR and the accounting measure - ATR.
Both are measures of tax revenue – or liabilities – in a year, expressed as a proportion of
pre-tax income in the same year. Yet the values of ATR are much lower than those of
ITR. Further, they tend to move in opposite directions: the former tends to fall in
recessions, while the latter tends to rise. In fact, the correlation between these two series
is negative: –0.24.
Both of these measures generate different values and patterns compared to the measure of
the effective average tax rate (EATR). By contrast, that is more stable over the period
analysed. This reflects the fact that it is based on legal tax provisions, rather than tax
revenues. In particular, it tends to be reasonably close to the statutory tax rate. But this
helps to pinpoint why the other two measures differ so much. Tax liabilities are equal to
the statutory tax rate multiplied by the tax base. The evidence from Figure 1 therefore
suggests that the denominator of the ATR measure – accounting pre-tax profits – tend to
be higher than taxable profit, while the denominator of the ITR measure tends to be
smaller than taxable income. Of course, this is not the whole explanation; the ITR
measure relates to a wide range of taxes, and not just to corporation tax.
For this reason we have used the aggregate data to develop an average tax rate measure
for the corporate sector only (ITR-COR). This is more comparable to the other average
tax rate measures, generally lying between the EATR and the ATR. We discuss it further
in Section 5.
There is some similarity in the two measures which are aimed at investigating marginal
tax rates: the EMTR and GKS. These both rise during the 1980s to a peak in around 1989
before falling back. However, the decline in GKS in the 1990s is more dramatic: from
about 44% in 1989 to just below 19% in 1993. In the second half of the 1990s there is a
partial recovery. The EMTR falls from around 31%, but much more slowly. In general,
this follows the pattern that the measures based on observed tax liabilities or revenues
tend to be rather more volatile than the measures based on legal tax provisions.
One of the important policy issues relating to this analysis is whether increasing
globalisation is driving increasing tax competition between countries, and hence lower
taxes on capital income. The European Commission (1997) has presented evidence (from
the 1980s and first half of the 1990s) in favour of this view, based on a version of the
ITR. As can be seen from Figure 1, the ITR in the UK does indeed fall over that time
period. There was also a fall in the EATR in the first half of the 1980s – when the
statutory tax rate was cut from 52% to 35% - and a smaller fall thereafter (the statutory
tax rate has subsequently been gradually cut to 30%).
However, the other measures in Figure 1 do not support this view. The accounting
measure – ATR – has remained reasonably stable since 1980, and if anything, has
increased. The EMTR increased as a result of the 1984 reforms, but has subsequently
fallen a little. As noted above, the GKS measure has been quite volatile.7
However, the aim of this paper is not to evaluate whether taxes on capital income have
fallen or not.
7 It is rather to compare alternative measures, to try to identify the reasons
for differences between them, and to discuss how they might be best measured in
practice. In order to address this, we now turn to a closer look at some of the main
measures.
3  Effective Tax Rates
Much of the discussion in the companion paper, Devereux (2003), concerns the
assumptions required to generate measures of effective marginal and average tax rates. In
particular, that paper raises issues concerning the role of personal taxes, alternative
sources of finance, international taxes, and risk. In this paper we will briefly summarise
the impact of different assumptions for the first two of these.
To begin, though, we first investigate the role played by alternative assumptions
regarding the real interest rate and the inflation rate, and by assumptions about the
weights corresponding to different assets and sources of finance used in the investment.
In Figure 1, we used actual rates in the UK to generate measures of both the effective
marginal and average tax rates. This gives some indication of the actual effective rate in
any particular year. However, it gives a less clear picture of the degree to which effective
tax rates have changed as a result of deliberate tax reform, as opposed to changes in
underlying economic circumstances.
To investigate this, in Figure 2 we present series for the EATR and EMTR based on a
constant real interest rate (10%) and constant inflation rate (3.5%). We also hold the
weights reflecting the different forms of investment and finance constant over time.
Variation in the resulting series therefore reflects only the impact of tax reforms. As can
be seen from the Figure, these two series correspond closely to those in Figure 1 (which
are reproduced here). The broad conclusions stated above are unchanged. Using constant
values of these parameters removes much of the year-to-year volatility in the series, but
the longer-term movement is not affected.8





















Notes: EATR: Effective average tax rate. (Economic profit rate 20%, assets: weighted
average of plant & machinery and land & buildings, source of finance: weighted average
of equity and debt, interest and inflation rates: as specified).
EMTR: Effective marginal tax rate. (Assets: weighted average of plant & machinery and
land & buildings, source of finance: weighted average of equity and debt, interest and
inflation rates: as specified).
In Figure 3, we compute the same tax rates under the assumption that the relevant
shareholder is a UK taxpayer who faces the highest rate of personal income tax and
capital gains tax. Introducing personal taxes has several effects. Most centrally, the
required post-tax rate of return from an investment in equity falls, since the post-tax
return from the alternative – assumed to be an interest-bearing deposit - also falls as
(nominal) interest received is now taxed. The dividend stream is also taxed, but for much
of the period analysed, this tax was reduced by the tax credit available under the UK
imputation system; and in any case, dividend taxation is only relevant for investment
financed by new equity. It should be noted that the top personal income tax rate was very
high in the 1970s; in fact, including an investment income surcharge, the rate reached
98% between 1974 and 1978. It has since fallen considerably, and has been at 40% since
the late 1980s. Figure 3 is based on the case introduced in Figure 2: the real interest rate,
inflation rate and weights are all fixed over time.9




















Notes: EATR: Effective average tax rate. (Economic profit rate 20%, assets: weighted
average of plant & machinery and land & buildings, source of finance: weighted average
of equity and debt, interest and inflation rates: fixed).
EMTR: Effective marginal tax rate. (Assets: weighted average of plant & machinery and
land & buildings, source of finance: weighted average of equity and debt, interest and
inflation rates: fixed).
Introducing personal taxes has a dramatic effect on both the EATR and the EMTR
8. The
very high personal tax rates in the 1970s have a striking effect on the EMTR: because
nominal interest income was taxed at very high rates, the real post-tax income from
lending was negative
9. As a result, the required pre-tax return from investment in equity
is large and negative. As personal tax rates fell, so the EMTR rose. By the end of the
period it is close to zero.
For the EATR, there are offsetting effects. As with the EMTR, the high taxation of
interest implies a lower discount rate, which raises the net present value of an investment
with a given pre-tax return. This tends to reduce the EATR, as it reduced the EMTR.
However, offsetting this, the return from the investment is also taxed at a higher level,
reflecting the personal tax as well as the corporate tax; this second factor plays a more
significant role for an investment which is profitable than for one which is marginal.
Consequently, the EATR could move in either direction. In practice, in the presence of
personal taxes, the EATR was higher in the 1970s, but fell at intervals through the period.
By the 1990s, the EATR was lower than in the absence of personal taxes.
Figure 4 again reproduces the series based on fixed interest and inflation rates from
Figure 2. This time however we also add in a series calculated for investment financed10
only by debt. As might be expected, both the EATR and the EMTR are lower in this case,
since the impact of interest deductibility is greater. However, the impact is noticeably
different between the EMTR and the EATR. Since the latter is defined for a profitable
investment, the impact of being allowed to deduct interest payments is fairly small,
relative to the income generated from the investment. Hence although there is some
benefit, the EATR does not change very significantly. However, in the case of a marginal
investment financed by debt, the interest payment is much more striking. In cases where
depreciation allowances are close to 100% (in the early 1980s, this was true for buildings
as well as for plant and machinery), the EMTR had large negative values.














Notes: EATR: Effective average tax rate. (Economic profit rate 20%, assets: weighted
average of plant & machinery and land & buildings, source of finance: weighted average
of equity and debt unless specified otherwise, interest and inflation rates: fixed).
EMTR: Effective marginal tax rate. (Assets: weighted average of plant & machinery and
land & buildings, source of finance: weighted average of equity and debt unless specified
otherwise, interest and inflation rates: fixed).
In sum, then – as has been pointed out elsewhere – the EMTR depends crucially on
assumptions about personal taxes and about the source of finance for the hypothetical
investment. The EATR also depends on these factors, although the effects are not as
dramatic.11
4  Accounting Data
A common approach in empirical work is to estimate measures of the taxation of income
from capital using company accounting data. Such data are now fairly readily available in
many countries. We make use of the data for all listed UK companies provided by
Thomson Financial Datastream. These data are available from around 1969 onwards. The
dataset contains just under 3,000 firms. The number of observations per firm ranges from
1 to 32. In total, the dataset contains around 38,000 observations.
The typical approach here is to take the ratio of tax liabilities to pre-tax profit as specified
in the profit and loss account. Devereux (2003) analysed such an approach, and compared
it to the effective average tax rate described above. Clearly there is a distinction in
principle between the two approaches. The accounting ratio represents the impact of tax
at a moment in time, and not over the life of a particular investment. Also, it reflects the
past history of the company and the tax regime, since many items are carried forward
from one year to the next. Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare the two approaches in
practice to identify whether they produce similar estimates of an average tax rate.
In using such data, however, many accounting issues need to be considered. First, profit
is generally computed on an historic cost basis, which typically overstates true profit in
periods of reasonably high inflation. But the tax system, too, is sensitive to inflation.
Thus the average tax rate may reflect this distortion to measuring both accounting profit
and taxable profit.
Second, most readily available datasets containing accounting records refer to
consolidated accounts – and, in particular, the consolidated accounts of multinational
companies which reflect profits earned around the world and taxes paid around the world.
It may be possible – and often is in the Datastream data – to identify separately home and
foreign tax liabilities.
10 But it is more difficult to identify separately profit generated at
home and abroad. Depending on the relative size of the foreign activities of the company,
this may pose considerable problems. If, for example, we want to find a measure relating
to the UK corporation tax, then we would want to include only UK tax, and UK profit.
Including all profit would understate the UK tax rate. Including all taxes paid by the
company would result in a measure which is contaminated by taxes paid elsewhere.
A third problem arises in that the published tax charge may not represent the company’s
current tax liability. Suppose, for example, that the tax regime is more generous than
implied by accounting standards, since depreciation allowances are higher than
accounting depreciation charges. Then in a period of investment, the recorded tax charge
may exceed the actual tax liability, as accountants include a provision for additional tax
to be paid in the future. At the extreme, the recorded tax provision may simply be the
statutory rate multiplied by pre-tax profit. Any difference between this and the actual tax
liability could be regarded as deferred tax. Of course, in this case, the tax rate generated
using the recorded tax charge as a ratio of pre-tax profit would therefore simply be the
statutory tax rate.12
We can largely avoid the third of these problems, since our data identify deferred tax. In
the series shown in Figure 1, we instead make use of an item which is closest to the full
UK corporation tax charge.
11 This is divided by pre-tax profit (after depreciation and
interest payments) to generate the average tax rate measure.
For comparison, Figure 5 shows this together with three other definitions of taxation:
(i)  UK corporation tax plus the overseas tax charge
(ii)  Total tax charge as recorded in accounts (including deferred tax)
(iii)  UK corporation tax, less advance corporation tax (ACT), but adding back
irrecoverable ACT.
12 This can be thought of as a measure of “mainstream”
corporation tax before any income tax due on dividends.



















Notes: The presented series are all variants of the ATR, the average tax rate based on
accounting data. CT stands for “Corporation Tax”. The series presented in Figure 1
corresponds to the series labelled “Total CT / Profits”.
In each case, an average tax rate is formed by taking the ratio of the tax liability to pre-
tax profits. Because the four measures of the average tax rate in Figure 5 are all
calculated with reference to the same measure of pre-tax profit, the differences between
them reflect only differences in the measure of taxation. The differences are striking.
First, in the early part of this period, the overseas tax charge was very high, at times even
greater than the UK tax charge. Measure (i) therefore results in average tax rates of
around 60% in the early 1970s. However, over time, this measure declines substantially.
Broadly, by the second half of the 1990s, the base case UK average tax rate was just over
20%, and including the overseas tax charge raised this to around 30%. Measure (ii) –13
including overseas tax and deferred tax – results in a similar pattern: very high tax rates
in the early 1970s, but dropping substantially over the period.
Although measure (i) does not relate only to UK taxation, arguably it gives a clearer
picture of the impact of worldwide taxes, since both the numerator and denominator
relate to worldwide activities. Based on this measure, then, there appears to have been a
striking decline in the average tax rate. By far the biggest part of this occurred in the
1970s.
13
The final measure (iii) in the Figure is close to mainstream corporation tax – before any
income tax is charged to UK shareholders. As might be expected, this is much lower. It
too fell in the 1970s, before partly recovering in the first half of the 1980s. In the 1990s it
was fairly stable at around 10% of pre-tax profit.
5  Measures based on macroeconomic data
The main outlier in Figure 1 is the overall average tax rate on capital income (ITR). This
is based on a measure proposed by Mendoza et al (1994). A similar series was calculated
by Eurostat (1998)
14 and is presented alongside the Mendoza measure in Figure 7. In
1970 this measure was at a very high rate of 77%. It moved considerably with the
economic cycle in the 1970s, falling to 51% in 1977, but rising to 73% again in the
recession of 1981. However, since 1981, it has fallen steadily to 32% in 1994, before
rising again slightly. By the mid 1990s, it was at a rate comparable to the statutory tax
rate on retained earnings. It is this dramatic fall in the 1980s and early 1990s which drew
the attention of the European Commission (1997). It is therefore worth examining this
measure in some detail.
The basic approach of this measure is first to classify all taxes – including personal taxes
on corporate source income - as being on labour, consumption or capital
15. The last of
these categories is, in effect, a sweep-up category; it includes taxes on capital income,
such as corporation tax, and taxes on property income, but it also includes inheritance
taxes and gift taxes. To turn this into a tax rate, these tax revenues are divided by a
measure of capital income, taken as the aggregate operating surplus of the economy.
Within the group of taxes on “capital”, there are two large categories – corporate income
taxes and taxes on ownership of land and property. There are a number of other smaller
taxes grouped together. Figure 6a shows the overall development of these taxes over
time, and Figure 6b shows the development of each group of taxes, both expressed as a
proportion of GDP. Each of these groups has generated broadly similar revenue over the
period, although all are fairly volatile. Most noticeably, revenue from all three groups has
declined as a proportion of GDP since the end of the 1980s.14
Figure 6: Analysis of the numerator of the Eurostat implicit capital tax rate
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Notes: These panels show components of the numerator of the Eurostat (1998) implicit
capital tax rate divided by GDP. Panel A shows the total numerator, panel B splits this up
into three components. Panel C splits taxes on land and buildings into subcomponents
and panel D splits corporate income taxes into subcomponents.
To examine these patterns further, the other parts of Figure 3.6 examine in turn the
development of taxes on land and buildings and corporate income taxes.
Figure 6c investigates the development of taxes on land and buildings by examining its
individual components, together with two other forms of property tax that are not
included. The relatively constant factor in these taxes is a property tax on businesses,
known as business rates.
However, the end of the 1980s and early 1990s witnessed changes in the system of
domestic property taxes. In 1989, the domestic property tax (domestic rates) was replaced
by the Community Charge. This was based on the number of individuals resident in a
property, and is not included by Eurostat (1998) as a tax on land and buildings. In 1993,
this was replaced by the Council Tax, which is again levied primarily on the property.
16
However, this is also not included by Eurostat (1998) as a tax on land and buildings
17.
The effect is that the aggregate revenue from taxes on land and buildings (expressed
again as a share of GDP) appears to fall sharply in 1990 when domestic rates were
abolished. Yet the overall level of these local domestic taxes remained fairly constant
over the entire period.
Figure 6d investigates the development of taxes on corporate income over the same
period. Here we distinguish between corporation tax, and special taxes on the profits15
from North Sea oil and gas production (notably Petroleum Revenue Tax). These special
taxes raised considerable amounts of revenue in the first half of the 1980s, but these
revenues dropped away sharply after that period due to lower oil prices and more costly
production. By contrast, revenue from corporation tax
18 rose sharply over the 1980s,
before falling back in the first half of the 1990s. Abstracting from the oil sector, then, it is
true that corporation tax revenues fell in the first half of the 1990s; however, the pattern
over a longer period shows that this was merely bringing revenue (as a proportion of
GDP) back down to its earlier levels. The pattern shown in Figure 6a is therefore rather
misleading.
The lesson of the analysis of Figure 6 is that the interpretation of an aggregate average
tax rate on capital can be problematic. In this case, the fall in the tax rate is caused by a
move from a purely property-based tax to a tax that is less directly related to property,
together with a fall in the oil price and hence the profitability of the off-shore oil
extraction business. Clearly neither change has more than an indirect effect on the
taxation of on-shore capital in the UK.
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Notes: ITR are implicit tax rates on capital from different sources, ITR-COR are implicit
tax rates for the corporate sector calculated under different assumptions.
For comparison with the other measures in this paper, which analyse taxes on capital
income generated in the corporate sector, it would be useful to have an average tax rate
applying to income generated in the corporate sector. We therefore develop such a
measure here
19. The numerator of this measure is in principle straightforward: total UK
corporation tax receipts (before deducting ACT). However, the appropriate denominator
is trickier. Broadly, we generate a measure of income generated by the corporate sector,16
net of interest payments to the personal sector, or abroad. Because of the deductibility of
interest for tax purposes, interest payments from the corporate sector to the personal
sector are taxed by the personal income tax system. As we do not include personal
income taxes on interest in the numerator, our measure would be biased downwards if we
did not make this adjustment.
20 Figure 7 presents this series (labelled “ITR-COR, revenue
based”) for the UK. Unfortunately, it is not possible to generate precise estimates of this
measure back as far as 1970. We therefore also present an approximation to the measure
(“labelled ITR-COR, approximate”), in which the denominator is not corrected for net
interest payments by the corporate sector. These two series are fairly close during the
period in which they are both available.
As can be seen, both are considerably lower than the original tax rate on capital proposed
by Mendoza et al. and the version used by Eurostat. The corporate sector average tax rate
does drop significantly in the first half the 1990s. However, it recovers in the second half
of the 1990s, and the level by the end of the 1990s was around that at the beginning of the
1980s. We can thus conclude that an overall average tax rate on capital can be very
misleading, certainly if its taken to be an approximate measure of the average tax rate on
income generated in the corporate sector.
We also take one further step in developing this measure, to offset volatility in the
measure due to timing. As taxes are paid with a lag, the tax rate is counter-cyclical: in a
recession profits fall, but revenues do not (at least initially) since they are largely based
on the previous year’s profits. The opposite happens in a boom. We abstract from this
effect by using a series on corporation tax accruals,
21 rather than revenues. As a result,
much of the volatility of the ITR measure disappears. It is also interesting to note that
after all of those adjustments, the measure has become much more similar to the measure
based on accounting data, the ATR.
The remaining measure of the group of measures based on macroeconomic data is the
marginal tax rate of the corporate sector based on the approach by Gordon et al. (2003).
Just as the ITR-COR (except for the accruals version) is more volatile than the effective
average tax rate measures based on tax legislation, so the GKS measure is more volatile
than the effective marginal tax rate. For the few years during which both are available,
the correlation is however strong, with a co-efficient of correlation of 0.72.
6  Conclusion
This paper explores the properties of alternative measures of the taxation of income from
capital, by applying them to data for the UK over the last thirty years. We consider
several types of measures, reflecting both average and marginal rates.
The main comparison between the broad measures is shown in Figure 1. It is clear that
there is a significant difference between the measures, both in their level and in how they
move over time. The implicit assumption in some empirical work that these measures are
broadly comparable to each other is not justified. Rather it can make a substantial17
difference whether the measure is based on a hypothetical investment or observed tax
liabilities or revenues; whether it is average or marginal; and whether data are derived
from company accounts or aggregate revenue series.
The remaining analysis considers the derivation of the measures in more detail, and
documents how different values can be derived by making different assumptions, or
using alternative forms of data. Section 3 shows how effective tax rate measures based on
hypothetical investments depend crucially on assumptions regarding personal taxes; the
source of finance used; and whether underlying economic parameters are allowed to vary
over time. Section 4 demonstrates how use of alternative definitions of taxation from
company accounts can give a markedly different picture of the development of taxes over
time. Section 5 explores measures based on aggregate revenue data. It shows how very
broad measures of taxes on “capital” depend crucially on what taxes are included in the
measure. It also indicates how a measure more focused on corporate income can be
developed.
In general, the broad conclusion is that appropriate choice of methodology and careful
use of data are both vital in the construction and use of tax rates which are intended to
summarise the taxation of income from capital. In using such measures, researchers
should take care both about the general approach taken, and also about detailed choices
made in the construction of tax rates.18
DATA APPENDIX
1 Effective Tax Rates
These are calculated as defined in Devereux and Griffith (2003). Further details –
including details of the corporate tax regime - are also available in Devereux, Griffith and
Klemm (2002).
Weights for the use of alternative assets and sources of finance are based on the mean of
the Datastream sample set out below, where:
weight for plant and machinery =  pm w = 328/(327+328)
weight for debt =  D w  = 321/392,
and where the codes refer to the following Datastream variables:
321 total loan capital
327  gross value of land and buildings
328  gross value of plant and machinery
392 total capital employed
These weights are applied within each hypothetical investment. Thus, instead of
computing the effective tax rate for a single hypothetical investment – say in plant and
machinery financed by debt – we consider an investment which consists partly of plant
and machinery and partly of buildings, financed by debt and equity. We then compute
one effective tax for the combined investment.
The real interest rate and inflation rate are either assumed to be fixed at 10% and 3.5%
respectively, or in cases where they are allowed to vary, National Statistics data are used.
The real interest rate then is the 20-year government bond rate (AJLX) plus an 8%
premium and inflation is the GDP deflator calculated using GDP in nominal (YBHA) and
1995 (ABMI) prices.
2 Accounting data tax measures
The measure in Figure 1 is ATR=160/154.
The other measures in Section 4 are (i) (160+167)/154 (ii) 172/154 (iii) (160-
ACT+164)/154, where ACT is (181+187)s/(1-s) and where s is the net ACT rate.
The numbers refer to the following Datastream account items:
154 pre-tax profit
160  corporation tax19
164  irrecoverable ACT
167 overseas tax
172  total tax charge
181  preference dividends
187  ordinary dividends
The dataset was obtained by downloading data on all UK quoted firms (including dead
firms) from Thomson Financial Datastream. From an initial dataset of nearly 4000 firms,
we dropped all observations with accounting periods that differed by more than 30 days
from a year. We also dropped observations lacking core data such as sales (104) and
cash-flow (182+136). Finally we dropped all firms for which we had less than four
consecutive observations. This left us with a sample of nearly 3000 firms and 38000
observations
3 Gordon-Kalambokidis-Slemrod (2003) measure.
This measure is defined as:
1 stock   capital   ) 1 (         base - R under    revenue    tax  -     system current    revenue Tax 






Tax revenue current system – tax revenue R-base tax =
( ) NHCI + DBGM + DBGP + NHCJ + CAPALL EABG) + (NHCM - NHCK + EABC − τ
lagged capital stock =  1 CIXI) + CIXJ + (CIXH − t
τ is the statutory corporation tax rate, and r is the real interest rate as defined above.
The four letter codes represent the following National Statistics data series:
EABC interest received (non-financial corporations)
NHCK interest received (financial corporations)
EABG interest paid by (non-financial corporations)
NHCM interest paid by (financial corporations)
DBGP gross fixed capital formation (non-financial corporations)
NHCJ gross fixed capital formation (financial corporations)
DBGM changes in inventories (non-financial corporations)
NHCI changes in inventories (financial corporations)
CIXH net capital stock (private non-financial corporations)
CIXJ net capital stock (public non-financial corporations)
CIXI net capital stock (financial corporations)
Data on capital allowances were taken from Inland Revenue Statistics:
CAPALL  capital allowances of corporations in financial year.20
4  Measures based on aggregate tax revenues
The Mendoza et al. measure was taken from E. Mendoza’s personal web page
(http://www.econ.duke.edu/~mendozae/). The Eurostat measure was constructed as
described in Eurostat (1998) using Eurostat data.
Our average tax rate for the corporate sector, based on tax revenue, is defined as:
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Net taxable property income = EABC+NHCK+FAOG+NHDH-EABG-NHCM-
FBXO-NHDK
The four letter codes represent the following National Statistics data series:
NQBE: Gross operating surplus, non-financial corporations
NQNV: Gross operating surplus, financial corporations
NSRV: Adjustment to property income (FISIM), financial corporations
EAXB: Gross trading profit of quasi-corporations
EABC: Interest received, non-financial corporations
NHCK: Interest received, financial corporations
FAOG: Rent received, non-financial corporations
NHDH: Rent received, financial corporations
EABG: Interest paid, non-financial corporations
NHCM: Interest paid, financial corporations
FBXO: Rent paid, non-financial corporations
NHDK: Rent paid, financial corporations
ACCD: Corporation tax revenues
ACCJ: Petroleum revenue tax revenues
DBGF: Capital consumption, non-financial corporations
NHCE: Capital consumption, financial corporations
The approximate measure is defined in a similar way, with the difference that net taxable
property income is not deducted from the denominator:
on depreciati   -   surplus   operating   Gross
ACCJ     ACCD+
The accruals based tax rate is defined as:21
income property    e net taxabl     on    depreciati     -     surplus   operating   gross
off - set   ACT        liability  Tax 
+
+
where the “tax liability” and “ACT set-off” are taken from Inland Revenue Statistics,
table 11.4, various years.22
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ENDNOTES
                                                
1 Volkerink et al. (2002) do that, at least for two different definitions of such tax rates: the
one suggested by Mendoza et al (1994) and a version suggested in their paper. They
replicate some recent empirical studies and find that results by Mendoza et al. (1997) and
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) are not substantially changed by using their measure.
2 Because of different sample sizes due to limited data availability, care needs to be taken
when comparing coefficients. For example, the correlation between ITR and ITR-COR
suggests that the movements in these measures are significantly positively correlated.
However, calculated over a longer time period of 27 observations using an approximate
version of the ITR-COR (see section 5), the co-efficient drops to 0.39 and becomes
insignificant.
3 That is, we consider only one investment, which is a weighted average of different
assets and sources of finance. We do not compute effective tax rates for each type of
asset and then find a weighted average of these.
4 This choice is somewhat arbitrary. The EATR as measured here lies between the EMTR
and the statutory tax rate. An economic profit rate of around 20% generates an EATR
which can differ from each of these extreme points.
5 These are based on data from company accounting records, taken from Thomson
Financial Datastream. Further details are given in the Data Appendix. On average, these
weights are: 57% plant and machinery; 43% buildings; 90% equity; 10% debt.
6 The rate for plant and machinery is 12.25%, and the rate of buildings is 3.61%. These
rates are taken from OECD (1991).
7 See Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002), for an analysis of this issue.25
                                                                                                                                                
8 Without personal taxes it makes no difference whether equity finance represents new
equity or retained earnings. With personal taxes the two differ. In Figure 3.3 we assume
all equity finance is new equity.
9 We implicitly assume here that the tax system is symmetric: that is loss-making firms
receive a tax rebate. In practice this is not generally true. Losses can be carried back to
offset against earlier profit, but only in a very limited way. Beyond that, they can be
carried forward indefinitely to set against future profit. But in doing so, the loss-making
firms bears a cost of delay in receiving the tax credit.
10 This is not always true. In some cases, tax liabilities which are clearly labelled as
overseas tax in the published accounts, are not separately identified in Datastream. This
would lead us to overstate the UK tax liability.
11 Datastream account item 160, labelled “Corporation Tax”.
12 ACT can be thought of as a prepayment of the shareholders’ income tax due on
dividend payments by the firm, and was paid by firms until 1999. Until 1997, it could be
reclaimed by zero-rated shareholders.  ACT payments by the firm could be offset against
the full tax charge, but only to the extent that gross dividends did not exceed taxable
profit. ACT which was unlikely to be offset within a reasonable period was charged
against profit, and was known as irrecoverable ACT
13 This may also be a more reliable measure, given the possible problems in under-
recording overseas tax in Datastream.
14 OECD (2001) suggests some modifications to the Mendoza et al. measure. For the UK
their changes reduce the estimate of the tax rate on capital income by on average 9
percentage points. However, the pattern over time is hardly affected, so we do not present26
                                                                                                                                                
this measure here. The proposed changes to the definition do not affect property taxes or
petroleum taxes, so that the following analysis would equally apply to their measure.
15 In Eurostat terminology this is referred to as a tax rate on “factors of production other
than employed labour” rather than “capital”. It is however usually interpreted as the tax
rate on capital, so we stick to this simpler label.
16 Council tax is based on the value of residential property, but it also depends on the
circumstances of the residents of a property. There are discounts for second homes and
properties inhabited by one person only. For some residents it is waived, e.g. for full-time
students.
17 The Mendoza et al. tax rate does include the Community Charge or the Council Tax.
18 This includes corporation tax on North Sea activities.
19 There have been previous attempts to define such tax rates for the corporate sector, e.g.
Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Nicodeme (2001), OECD (2001) and literature cited
therein. None of them have however attempted to deal with taxable property income,
including interest.
20 See the Data Appendix for details. Note that these adjustments are even more
important if one wished to calculate such a tax rate for a sub-sector of the economy, e.g.
the manufacturing sector. The net interest flows from this sector to the financial sector
would be substantial.
21 From Inland Revenue Statistics.CESifo Working Paper Series
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